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Article
When Structure Fails:
Justice Kennedy, Liberty, and Trump v. Hawaii
FRANK J. COLUCCI†
This symposium Article situates Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s final concurring opinion in Trump v.
Hawaii within his larger jurisprudence. Part I traces its separation of powers foundations by
examining then-Judge Kennedy’s Ninth Circuit opinions in Chadha v. INS and Beller v. Middendorf.
While in Chadha Kennedy shows sensitivity to how congressional action can threaten personal liberty,
in Beller he expresses substantial deference to executive decisions about military necessity and foreign
policy at the expense of personal liberties. Part II reviews several early Supreme Court opinions,
where Kennedy articulates a judicial duty to police separation of powers as essential to liberty, yet
expresses willingness to protect presidential power from both direct and indirect threats from
Congress and the courts. Part III reexamines Kennedy’s opinions in enemy combatant cases after
2001, culminating in Boumediene v. Bush. These opinions, often read as a rebuke of executive power,
in fact express his primary concern with both preserving personal liberty and preventing
congressional abdication of its powers. Part IV surveys later Kennedy opinions leading to Trump that
uphold exclusive executive power—especially in areas of immigration and foreign affairs—from the
burdens of legislative and judicial intrusion even at the cost to individual liberty. Part V focuses on
Kennedy’s final opinion in Trump, where he characteristically votes to protect presidential power and
ensure that neither Congress nor courts should “intrude on the foreign affairs power of the
Executive.”1
This Article’s conclusion explores the tension Kennedy explicitly recognizes in Trump between two
main strands of his jurisprudence: protection of presidential prerogative in foreign affairs and the
judicial obligation to define and enforce personal liberty. His “further observation” in Trump,
recognizes how liberty relies ultimately on politicians exercising statesmanship and public confidence
that they act with fidelity to larger constitutional values. Despite promises expressed in his earlier
opinions, Kennedy in Trump finally concedes that neither constitutional structure nor courts enforcing
law are sufficient to secure liberty.

† Associate Professor of Political Science, Purdue University Northwest. I'd like to thank the HLJ staff—
especially Nina Gliozzo and Alyxandra Vernon—for their fine editorial work. Errors of course remain my own.
This Article was profoundly influenced by the example of my advisor Donald P. Kommers, who spent
his life teaching and writing about the importance of constitutionalism and the limits of law.
1. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424 (2018).
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INTRODUCTION
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s final concurrence in Trump v. Hawaii2
shaped both initial reactions to his retirement from the U.S. Supreme Court and
first assessments of his legacy. Commentators called his vote to join the Trump
majority, which allowed President Trump’s order banning entry by nationals of
several countries to take effect, a “betrayal,”3 a “surrender,”4 and a “coup.”5
Others categorized Kennedy’s last opinion as “depressing defeatism,”6 “at odds”
with the “animating principles” of his larger approach to law.7 Still others read
it as an “empty gesture” and “an expression of defeat and a loss of integrity . . . at
precisely the moment that it was most needed”8 or “an elusive conclusion for the
career of an elusive justice.”9

2. Id. (overturning lower court preliminary injunction suspending enforcement of Proclamation No. 9645,
82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017)).
3. Noah Feldman, Opinion, Justice Kennedy’s Legacy Is the Dignity He Bestowed, BLOOMBERG NEWS
(June 27, 2018, 12:24 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-06-27/anthony-kennedyretirement-his-legacy-is-dignity-he-created.
4. Christian Farias, Justice Kennedy Surrendered to Donald Trump, N.Y. MAG. (June 27, 2018),
http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/06/justice-kennedy-surrendered-to-donald-trump.html.
5. Id.
6. Richard L. Hasen, Did Anthony Kennedy Just Signal His Retirement? (Update: Yes.), SLATE (June 26,
2018, 1:38 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/did-justice-anthony-kennedy-just-signal-hisretirement.html.
7. Pratheepan Gulasekaram, An Immigration Legacy at Odds with Justice Kennedy’s Animating
Principles, SCOTUSBLOG (July 3, 2018, 7:29 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/07/an-immigrationlegacy-at-odds-with-justice-kennedys-animating-principles/.
8. Leslie Kendrick & Micah Swartzmann, Comment, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 133,
169 (2018) (footnote omitted).
9. Josh Blackmun, The Travel Bans, 2017–2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 29, 47.
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Kennedy’s own words in Trump contribute to this confusion. He begins by
admitting “the substantial deference that is and must be accorded to the
Executive in the conduct of foreign affairs.”10 His final paragraphs, however,
speak to the “urgent necessity that officials adhere to these constitutional
guarantees.”11 “An anxious world,” he concludes, requires reassurance “that our
Government remains committed always to the liberties the Constitution seeks to
preserve and protect, so that freedom extends outward, and lasts.”12
Read in light of his previous opinions in separation of powers cases,
Kennedy’s ambiguity in Trump merits deeper exploration. Kennedy’s record in
separation of powers cases is not merely “pragmatic” and “centrist.”13 Even
before coming to the U.S. Supreme Court, Kennedy exercised judicial power to
enforce his belief that constitutional structure is essential to preserving
individual liberty.14 On the Court, he vigorously enforced separation of powers,
including limits on executive power in cases like Clinton v. City of New York15
and Boumediene v. Bush.16 His judicial commitment to enforcing the full and
necessary meaning of liberty requires that courts not leave structural issues
solely to political resolution, but vigilantly enforce written and functional limits
on the powers of each branch. “When structure fails,” Kennedy wrote, “liberty
is always in peril.”17 For the bulk of his career, Kennedy found failures of
constitutional structure arose more often from congressional abdication or
judicial intrusion than from executive overreach. His Trump opinion suggests a
final reconsideration of this presumption.
This Article situates Justice Kennedy’s final concurrence in Trump v.
Hawaii within his larger jurisprudence. Part I traces the foundations by
examining his Ninth Circuit opinions in Chadha v. INS and Beller v.
Middendorf. Even in these early cases, then-Judge Kennedy’s enforcement of
separation of powers is primarily concerned with threats to executive power
from Congress. While in Chadha Kennedy is sensitive to how legislative actions
can threaten personal liberty,18 in Beller he expresses substantial deference to
executive decisions about military necessity and foreign policy, even at the cost
of personal liberties protected under the Constitution.19 Part II reviews several
10. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424 (2018) (Kennedy, J. concurring).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Contra Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall Kelso, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Justice Kennedy on
Separation of Powers and Federalism, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 531, 582 (2014).
14. See infra Part I.
15. 524 U.S. 417, 450, 452–53 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (writing separately to discuss separation
of powers and noting even if separation of powers proves insufficient this “cannot validate an otherwise
unconstitutional device”).
16. 553 U.S. 723, 764–66 (2008) (majority opinion by Kennedy, J.) (“The Government’s formal
sovereignty-based test raises troubling separation-of-powers concerns as well.”).
17. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 468 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
18. 634 F.2d 408, 422 (9th Cir. 1980).
19. 632 F.2d 788, 810–11 (9th Cir. 1980).
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opinions from early in Justice Kennedy’s tenure on the Court, which describe
his judicial duty to police separation of powers as essential to liberty while acting
to protect executive power from both direct and indirect threats from Congress
and courts. Part III surveys Justice Kennedy’s opinions in enemy combatant
cases after 2001, culminating in Boumediene. These opinions, often read as
rebukes of executive power, in fact express his primary concern with both liberty
and preventing congressional abdication of its power to suspend habeas corpus.
Part IV surveys several later Justice Kennedy opinions leading up to Trump
which uphold exclusive executive power—especially in areas of immigration
and foreign affairs—from the burdens of legislative and judicial intrusion.
Justice Kennedy sustains executive power even when conceding the cost to
individual liberty. Part V focuses on Justice Kennedy’s final opinion in Trump,
assessing its consistencies with, and departures from, his larger approach to
separation of powers. In Trump, he characteristically votes to protect presidential
power and to ensure that neither Congress nor courts should “intrude on the
foreign affairs power of the Executive,” but adds a “further observation” which
recognizes consequences for the preservation of liberty in the Court’s ruling.20
This Article concludes by exploring the tension Kennedy recognizes in
Trump between two main strands of his broader jurisprudence: protection of
presidential power in foreign affairs and the judicial obligation to protect
personal liberty. It then reconsiders the consequences of his “further
observation” that true security for liberty relies ultimately on politicians
exercising statesmanship and public confidence in their fidelity to constitutional
values.21 Despite promises inherent and explicit in his earlier opinions, in Trump,
Justice Kennedy finally admits that neither constitutional structure nor courts
suffice to guarantee liberty.22
I. JUDGE KENNEDY AND SEPARATION OF POWERS ON THE NINTH CIRCUIT:
CHADHA AND BELLER
Kennedy’s commitments to judicial enforcement of separation of powers
and to preserving executive prerogatives date from his two major Ninth Circuit
opinions concerning constitutional structure: Chadha v. INS23 and Beller v.
Middendorf.24 His opinions in Chadha—later affirmed on different grounds by
the Supreme Court—and Beller offer previews to how he would eventually
approach separation of powers issues on the Court, and provide some premises
underlying his last Trump v. Hawaii opinion. In these Ninth Circuit opinions,
then-Judge Kennedy eschews textualism and originalism for a more functional
20. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424 (2018) (Kennedy, J. concurring).
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. 634 F.2d. 408, aff’d on other grounds, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
24. 632 F.2d. 788, cert. denied sub nom., Beller v. Lehman, 452 U.S. 905 (1981), overruled by Witt v.
Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008).
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analysis sensitive to threats to the effective exercise of executive power.25 These
opinions arise from an overriding concern with congressional attempts both to
assume the powers of other branches—especially the executive—and to abdicate
its own authority. At the same time, Kennedy articulated his willingness to defer
to executive power in military and foreign affairs, even in a case where a plaintiff
raises a strong claim based on constitutional liberty.26
Kennedy’s Ninth Circuit opinion in Chadha invalidated the one-house
legislative veto traditionally used to overturn orders preventing deportation as
provided under the Immigration and Nationality Act.27 While his ruling was
affirmed and broadened by the Supreme Court,28 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for
the Ninth Circuit was based not on original history or the text of the presentment
clause (as was Chief Justice Burger’s opinion for the Court), but on a broader
functional analysis of separation of powers and the proper role of judiciary.29
Kennedy explicitly rejects claims—such as those presented in Justice
White’s Supreme Court dissent—that the distribution of power among branches
is a “history of accommodation and practicality” and “a necessary check on the
unavoidably expanding power of the agencies, both Executive and independent,
as they engage in exercising authority delegated by Congress.”30 “It would stand
the political question doctrine on its head,” Justice Kennedy writes, “to require
the Judiciary to defer to another branch’s determination that its acts do not
violate the separation of powers principle.”31 As Justice Kennedy elaborates, “it
is the Judiciary’s prerogative . . . to adjudicate a claimed excess by a coordinate
branch of its constitutional powers.”32
Kennedy concludes the legislative veto, as exercised in this particular case,
“violates the constitutional doctrine of separation because it is a prohibited
legislative intrusion upon the Executive and Judicial branches” that is “usurping
a necessary power of another branch.”33 To conduct this analysis, he writes, “we
must examine the purpose and function of the constitutional doctrine,
particularly as it pertains to the boundaries of legislative authority.”34

25. See infra note 69.
26. See Beller, 632 F.2d at 810–11.
27. Chadha, 634 F.2d. at 411, 420 (holding that the statutory provision for one-house veto violates the
doctrine of separation of powers).
28. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 928 (1983).
29. See Chadha, 634 F.2d at 420–21. In a 1984 speech explaining his process and reasoning while deciding
Chadha, Kennedy said, “I had mentioned the presentment clause, but struck it from the last draft as superfluous
to our holding.” Anthony M. Kennedy, Judge, Ninth Cir., Hoover Lecture at Stanford Law School 1 (May 17,
1984) (on file with Journal) [hereinafter Kennedy, Hoover Lecture].
30. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 999, 1002 (White, J., dissenting).
31. Chada, 634 F.2d at 419.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 420–421.
34. Id. at 421.
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For Kennedy, separation of powers “is neither doctrinaire nor rigid” but “a
cautious balance of antimonies.”35 It “is at once pervasive and fluid” and “there
will be instances where the proper means for its enforcement rest with the mutual
respect that each branch of the Government must extend to the others.”36 Yet,
when “transgressions are more patent. . . . it is the duty of the Judicial Branch to
resolve disputes with or among the other component parts of the Government.”37
In Chadha’s case, “a private litigant is, in part, a surrogate for a branch whose
powers have been usurped” and who “asserts a separate and personal legal
interest, namely, that the exercise of government power exceeds constitutional
bounds and is therefore an unlawful invasion of individual rights.”38
Kennedy finds two purposes in enforcement of separation of powers. The
first is “to prevent an unnecessary and therefore dangerous concentration of
power in one branch.”39 Justice Kennedy fears “the natural tendency of each
center of power to compete to enlarge or maintain its own influence.”40 He thus
seeks “to deter any one branch from attaining hegemony,” as “[a]n undue
concentration of authority in one branch inevitably causes structural
decomposition of the other branches, along with a dispersal of their original
powers.”41
Kennedy notes that a second purpose of separation of powers is “a practical
measure to facilitate administration of large nation by the assignment of
numerous labors to designated authorities.”42 Unlike Justice White, he concludes
that constitutional limits to delegations apply to this legislative veto.43 “Just as
the separation of powers prohibits the accumulation of too much power in one
branch, the nondelegation doctrine prevents one branch from abrogating its
authority in a wholesale and standardless manner.”44
From these two principles, Kennedy defines a
constitutional violation of the separation of powers as an assumption by one
branch of powers that are central or essential to the operation of a coordinate
branch, provided also that the assumption disrupts the coordinate branch in the
performance of its duties and is unnecessary to implement a legitimate policy of
the Government.45

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id. at 421–422.
Id. at 422.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 422–423.
Id. at 423.
Id.
Id. at 423–24.
Id. at 424.
Id. at 425.
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He goes further: “[i]f an exercise of functions which lie at the center of another
branch is attempted on a long-term and routine basis, a violation of the
constitutional rule requiring separation of powers is more easily established.”46
Kennedy conducts an extensive analysis of the one-house veto and finds “a
constitutional violation” and usurpation of both executive and judicial power.47
First, he finds the one-house veto “an interference with a central function of the
Judiciary, . . . [one] both disruptive and unnecessary.”48 Courts review “whether
the Executive branch has corrected applied the statute that establishes its
authority.”49 The ability of Congress to overturn such a decision “implies a
radical alteration of the role of federal courts in the field of administrative law,”
making judicial rulings, “in effect, impermissible advisory opinions.”50 With the
threat of this veto, “the Legislative branch has disrupted or severed the
Judiciary’s relation to the alien in a substantial way” and “potential nullification
of judicial attempts to require uniform application of the statute by the
Executive.”51 This legislative veto “diminishes the strength of the Judiciary’s
structural check on the Executive, which is one of the twin purposes behind the
separation of powers principle.”52
Kennedy emphasizes the subordination of judiciary to the legislature under
the one-house veto, “thus undermining the integrity of the third branch.”53 In his
view, by doing this, Congress “disrupts the judicial system by retaining a
selective power to override individual adjudications, in lieu of changing
standards prospectively by the usual, corrective device of a statutory
amendment.”54 He finds “virtually no procedural constraints on the ultimate
congressional decision.”55
Justice Kennedy also finds the very existence of the legislative veto
disruptive to the executive and the judiciary. He criticizes “legislative
interference, constant in its potentiality, can be exercised in any given case
without a change in the general standards the legislature has initially decreed.”56
The possibility of “[s]ummary reversal” of “an action that carried all of the
weight and dignity that necessarily attends deliberative decisions by one of the
highest officers in the Executive branch” by one house of Congress “detracts
from the authority of the second branch, and to that extent undermines its

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id. at 429.
Id. at 430.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 431.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 432.
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powers.”57 He finds this interference “with a relation between the second branch
and the persons governed by its decisions” to be “egregious.”58
Even while, “Congress holds all legislative powers”59 and “[t]he statute
was enacted for the most humanitarian of considerations,”60 Kennedy writes:
We cannot accept that definite, uniform, and sensible criteria . . . should be
replaced by a species of nonlegislation, wherein the Executive branch becomes a
sort of referee in making an initial determination which has no independent force
or validity, even after review by the Judiciary, save and except for the exercise
of final control by the unfettered discretion of Congress as to each case. 61

For Justice Kennedy, “[s]uch flexibility is but the structural twin of lawless
rule.”62
In a 1984 lecture delivered after the Supreme Court’s decision in Chadha,
Kennedy admitted his differences from Chief Justice Burger’s majority decision
based solely on the presentment clause.63 He conceded that the “more sweeping
approach” adopted by the Supreme Court “emphasized the specific language of
the Constitution.”64 While “[p]art of my approach was that of an interpretivist
with a focus on the intent of the framers . . . . In reviewing the opinion, it does
not seem to me to be entirely successful in this regard.”65
For Kennedy, the challenge was neither textual nor historical, but practical.
“[T]he ultimate question Chadha poses is how to bring a sense of order and
responsibility to the shambles that is now the congressional process.”66 He
questioned the consequences of Justice Burger’s broader ruling. “If you strike
down the legislative veto, you trim the powers of the legislative branch, but you
may be doing it at the expense of allowing a sprawling federal bureaucracy to
go uncontrolled.”67 Yet he also noted, “[i]f we say that agencies constitute a
fourth branch of the government, and it is necessary to control them, is it not a
problem of modern political science to design the remedy, rather than to rely on
interpretation of the writings of 1788?”68 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit “tried to
follow a functionalist analysis in the balance of the opinion and thus relied on
something more than history.”69
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 435.
60. Id. at 436.
61. Id. at 435–36.
62. Id. at 436.
63. Kennedy, Hoover Lecture, supra note 29, at 1.
64. Id. at 4. Kennedy also spoke in August 1987 at a Ninth Circuit judicial conference panel titled “A
Bicentennial Review of Separation of Powers: What Is the Role of Courts in Constitutional Interpretation?”
While on a panel along with fellow federal judges William A. Norris and Frank Easterbrook, as well as Stanford
Law School Dean Paul Brest, Kennedy made no specific comments about his decision in Chadha.
65. Id. at 4.
66. Id. at 2.
67. Id. at 4.
68. Id. at 4.
69. Id. at 5.
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Kennedy’s functionalism focuses on the propensity of Congress to disrupt
the executive and legislative branches. He noted in his speech “we might have
been somewhat harsh to Congress” in the Chadha opinion.70 But he was no less
harsh to Congress later in the 1984 address: “The ultimate question then is
whether the Chadha decision will be the catalyst for some basic congressional
changes.”71 He admitted “[m]y view of this is not a sanguine one”72 and reflected
that he was “not sure what it will take for Congress to confront its own lack of
self-discipline, its own lack of a principled course of action besides the ethic of
securing its reelection.”73 Kennedy’s criticism extends beyond those he
attributes to the Framers: “Madison distrusted Congress because it would
aggrandize the other branches; but I think the more real concern is its
competence within its own legitimate sphere.”74
Kennedy expressed such criticism of Congress in other off-the-bench
statements. In a 1982 speech he stated, “Congress must acknowledge its
constitutional responsibility and begin to articulate its legislative judgments in
constitutional terms.”75 If Congress fails to provide such an articulation, he
continued, “I would contend that courts should rescind the rule that a legislative
act is presumed to be constitutional. A presumption should not exist if it does
not mirror a reality.”76
Kennedy’s opinion in Beller, upholding the Navy’s policy to discharge
those who engage in homosexual activity, expressed sensitivity to claims of
individual rights, but ultimately upheld executive authority based on judicial
deference to military necessity.77 Beller thus differs from a later opinion issued
by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals—written by Robert Bork and
joined by Antonin Scalia—that rejected the challenge as having no right “solidly
based in constitutional text and history” and simply applied a rational basis
test.78
Kennedy’s Beller opinion explicitly recognizes the plaintiffs’ claims that
the policy violates their rights to substantive due process. Even before the
Supreme Court’s decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,79 Kennedy notes “there is
substantial academic comment which argues that the choice to engage in
homosexual action is a personal decision entitled, at least in some instances, to
recognition as a fundamental right and to full protection as an aspect of the
70. Id. at 5.
71. Id. at 8.
72. Id. at 8.
73. Id. at 8.
74. Id. at 8.
75. Anthony M. Kennedy, Judge, Ninth Cir., Address at the Los Angeles Patent Lawyers Association 9
(Feb. 1982) (on file with the Journal) [hereinafter Kennedy, L.A. Patent Lawyer’s Assoc.].
76. Id.
77. See Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 810–11 (9th Cir. 1980), overruled by Witt v. Dep’t of the Air
Force, 527 F.3d 806, 819 (9th Cir. 2008).
78. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d. 1388, 1397–98 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
79. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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individual’s right to privacy.”80 He does admit “substantial authority to the
contrary.”81 Nevertheless, he writes, “we can concede arguendo that the reasons
which led the Court to protect certain private decisions intimately linked with
one’s personality suggest that some kinds of government regulation of private
consensual homosexual behavior may face substantial constitutional challenge”
and “might be constitutionally protected activity in some other contexts.”82
Using language that would appear in his Supreme Court opinion in
Lawrence v. Texas,83 Kennedy states, “[t]he instant cases, however, are not ones
in which the state seeks to use its criminal processes to coerce persons to comply
with a moral precept even if they are consenting adults acting in private without
injury to each other.”84 Focusing on the specific military policies challenged, he
writes, “these appeals require an assessment of a military regulation which
prohibits personnel from engaging in homosexual conduct while they are in the
service.”85 Writing for the court, he held “that the importance of the government
interests furthered, and to some extent the relative impracticality at this time of
achieving the Government’s goals by regulations which turn more precisely on
the facts of an individual case, outweigh whatever heightened solicitude is
appropriate for consensual private homosexual conduct.”86
Kennedy ruled such “heightened solicitude” is outweighed by the need for
judicial deference to the considerations of military and foreign policy necessity
advanced by the executive.87 “The nature of the employer—the Navy—is crucial
to our decision.”88
His opinion displays substantial judicial deference to the determinations of
military necessity made by executive officials. “While it is clear that one does
not surrender his or her constitutional rights upon entering the military,” such
rights “must be viewed in light of the special circumstances and needs of the
armed forces.”89 Kennedy cites, among these special needs, the effect on internal
discipline and external foreign policy with other nations and finds “multiple
grounds for the Navy to deem this regulation appropriate for the full and efficient
accomplishment of its mission.”90 These include acting “to protect the fabric of
military life, to preserve the integrity of the recruiting process, to maintain the
discipline of personnel in active service, and to insure the acceptance of men and
women in the military, who are sometimes stationed in foreign countries with
80. Beller, 632 F.2d at 809.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 810, 812.
83. Kennedy there states forming such relationships “is within the liberty of persons to choose without
being punished as criminals.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
84. Beller, 632 F.2d at 810.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 811.
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cultures different from our own.”91 Even if “concerns expressed by the Navy
might not apply in any particular case, [they] do have some basis in fact. These
considerations are enough to sustain the regulation in its military context.”92
While the court is “mindful that the rule discharging these plaintiffs is a
harsh one in their individual cases,” it “cannot under the guise of due process
give our opinion on the fairness of every application of the military
regulation.”93 Indeed, the opinion notes that “[u]pholding the challenged
regulations as constitutional is distinct from a statement that they are wise.”94
For Kennedy, “[t]he latter judgment is neither implicit in our decision nor within
our province to make.”95 The opinion concludes, “the constitutionality of the
regulations stems from the needs of the military, the Navy in particular, and from
the unique accommodations between military demands and what might be
constitutionally protected activity in some other contexts.”96
And while “the Navy’s blanket rule requiring discharge . . . is perhaps
broader than necessary to accomplish some of its goals, as the somewhat
narrower regulation now in effect suggests” the policy as applied in the
individual cases seems to “permit at least some flexibility.”97 Yet in considering
the constitutionality of the mandatory discharge policy—as a judge— Kennedy
defers to military and executive judgments:
In view of the importance of the military’s role, the special need for discipline
and order in the service, the potential for difficulties arising out of possible close
confinement aboard ships or bases for long periods of time, and the possible
benefit to recruiting efforts, however, we conclude that at the present time the
regulation represents a reasonable effort to accommodate the needs of the
Government with the interests of the individual.98

Then-Judge Kennedy’s Ninth Circuit opinions in Chadha and in Beller
offer previews of his approach to separation of powers on the Supreme Court
and to his final concurring opinion in Trump. In these cases, Kennedy sees
limitations federal power as essential to personal liberty and engages in an
assertive judicial role to enforce these limits of each branch. Yet his primary
concern is to limit the power of Congress and to preserve executive prerogatives.
Further, in preserving executive power—particularly in relations with other
nations—Kennedy admits the Constitution may not authorize judicial action to
protect “what might be constitutionally protected activity in some other

91.
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93.
94.
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Id. at 812.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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contexts.”99 In such areas, comments on the wisdom of executive policy are
“neither implicit in our decision nor within our province to make.”100
II. JUSTICE KENNEDY, LIBERTY, AND JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF SEPARATION
OF POWERS
Both before and during his tenure as a Justice, Kennedy continually argued
that separation of powers promote individual liberty. “[T]he enforcement power
of the judiciary,” Justice Kennedy stated in his confirmation hearing, “is to
insure [sic] that the word liberty . . . is given its full and necessary meaning,
consistent with the purposes of the document as we understand it.”101 For Justice
Kennedy, personal liberty includes political interests in constitutional structure
and judicial policing of the limits of the power of each branch of government.
As he stated in a 1987 address shortly before his nomination, “it is legally wrong,
morally wrong, ethically wrong, for an individual to surrender essential power
over his or her personality to a remote government that he or she cannot control
in a direct and practical way.”102 At his confirmation hearings, Justice Kennedy
called such alienation of political liberty “spiritually wrong.”103
On the Court, Justice Kennedy considered Congress as the remote authority
and the greater threat to individual liberty. Even when federal legislation
empowers the President beyond the limits of the Constitution, Justice Kennedy
directs his criticism to congressional abdication rather than executive
overreach.104 Further, his opinions focus on the functional effect of
congressional and even judicial action on the ability of the president to exercise
constitutional powers such as appointments, policy execution and foreign policy.
In Bond v. United States,105 Justice Kennedy connects considerations of
judicial enforcement of federalism and separation of powers, as he did in
Chadha.106 Justice Kennedy states that the Constitution seeks “to protect each
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 122 (1987) [hereinafter Hearings] (emphasis
added).
For three examples of judicial studies that find liberty central to understanding Kennedy, see FRANK J.
COLUCCI, JUSTICE KENNEDY’S JURISPRUDENCE: THE FULL AND NECESSARY MEANING OF LIBERTY (2009)
HELEN J. KNOWLES, THE TIE GOES TO FREEDOM: JUSTICE ANTHONY M. KENNEDY ON LIBERTY (2009));
ANTHONY D. BARTL, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE KENNEDY: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY
AND EQUALITY (2014).
102. Anthony M. Kennedy, Judge, Ninth Cir., Address at the Historical Society for the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California: Federalism: The Theory and the Reality 13 (Sept. 17, 1987) (on
file with the Journal).
103. Hearings, supra note 101, at 200.
104. See infra notes 125–126.
105. 564 U.S. 211 (2011).
106. I explore Kennedy’s federalism in more depth in COLUCCI, supra note 101, at 135–39 and Frank J.
Colucci, Justice Kennedy’s Federalism and the Limits of State Sovereignty, 49 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM
(forthcoming 2019).
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branch of government from incursion by others.”107 Yet it also intends that “[t]he
structural principles secured by the separation of powers protect the
individual.”108 For this proposition, he cites Chadha.109 Although the legislative
veto “diminished the role of the Executive,” to Justice Kennedy “[a] cardinal
principle of separation of powers was vindicated at the insistence of an
individual, indeed one who was not a citizen of the United States but who still
was a person whose liberty was at risk.”110 He then continues: “If the
constitutional structure of our Government that protects individual liberty is
compromised, individuals who suffer otherwise justiciable injury may
object.”111 “Just as it is appropriate for an individual, in a proper case, to invoke
separation of powers or checks-and-balances constraints,” he concludes, “so too
may a litigant, in a proper case, challenge a law as enacted in contravention of
constitutional principles of federalism.”112
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Clinton v. City of New York, striking
congressional legislation granting the president a line-item veto, emphasized his
connection between enforcing constitutional structure and preserving individual
liberty.113 He writes in response to Justice Breyer, who claims that the allocation
of powers among the branches is a political question.114 Justice Kennedy replies:
“Liberty is always at stake when one or more of the branches seek to transgress
the separation of powers.”115 To him, the branch clearly most likely to transgress
is the most powerful one: Congress. As he writes, “[c]oncentration of power in
the hands of a single branch is a threat to liberty.”116
In Clinton, Justice Kennedy does take a brief originalist turn: “[s]o
convinced were the Framers that liberty of the person inheres in structure that at
first they did not consider a Bill of Rights necessary.”117 For him, liberty is “not
so confined” to “that word in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and as
illuminated by the other provisions of the Bill of Rights.”118 Separation of
powers, along with federalism, intended “to secure liberty in the fundamental
political sense of the term, quite in addition to the idea of freedom from intrusive
governmental acts.”119 To Justice Kennedy, this political sense reiterates the
conception of political liberty:

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Bond, 564 U.S. at 222.
Id.
Id. at 223.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 223–24.
524 U.S. 417, 449–53 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See id. at 469–97 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 450 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The idea and the promise were that when people delegate some degree of control
to a remote central authority, one branch of government ought not possess the
power to shape their destiny without a sufficient check from the other two. In this
vision, liberty demands limits on the ability of any one branch to influence basic
political decisions.120

As in other aspects of his jurisprudence, Justice Kennedy focused on
taxation: “It follows that if a citizen who is taxed has the measure of the tax or
the decision to spend determined by the Executive alone, without adequate
control by the citizen’s Representatives in Congress, liberty is threatened.”121
The presidential veto “establishes a new mechanism which gives the President
the sole ability to hurt a group that is a visible target, in order to disfavor the
group or to extract further concessions from Congress.”122 The individual “loses
liberty in a real sense . . . [without] traditional constitutional constraints.”123
Justice Kennedy finds “[t]he law is the functional equivalent of a line item
veto and enhances the President’s powers beyond what the Framers would have
endorsed.”124 Ultimately, however, he blames Congress for this constitutional
violation. “That a congressional cession of power is voluntary,” he writes, “does
not make it innocuous.”125 Even if the law might act “to restrain persistent
excessive spending. . . . Abdication of responsibility is not part of the
constitutional design.”126
Justice Kennedy ties his conception of judicial authority to enforce
separation of powers in the name of liberty to Chadha, although this vision of
Chadha seems to reflect more his functional analysis for the Ninth Circuit than
Justice Burger’s textualism for the Supreme Court majority. Justice Kennedy
reiterates his ideal that separation of powers “operates on a horizontal axis to
secure a proper balance of legislative, executive and judicial authority.”127 It also
“operates on a vertical axis . . . between each branch and the citizens in whose
interests powers must be exercised.”128 For him, “[t]he citizen has a vital interest
in the regularity of the exercise of governmental power.”129 As he elaborates,
“[i]f this point was not clear before Chadha, it should have been so afterwards.”
Despite the differences in the cases, he finds they share a concern about this
direct relationship. “By increasing the power of the President beyond what the
Framers envisioned the statute compromises the political liberty of our citizens,
liberty which the separation of powers seeks to secure.”130
120.
121.
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124.
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126.
127.
128.
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130.

Id. at 450–51.
Id. at 451.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 452.
Id. at 449, 452.
Id. at 452.
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The Clinton opinion concludes with a shot at Congress: “The Constitution
is not bereft of controls over improvident spending.”131 One is his beloved
federalism, “for political accountability is easier to enforce within the States than
nationwide.”132 The other “is control of the political branches by an informed
and responsible electorate.”133 He concludes by noting that “[t]he Framers of the
Constitution could not command statesmanship. They could simply provide
structures from which it might emerge.”134 Their failure “cannot validate an
otherwise unconstitutional device.”135
Justice Kennedy expresses his conception of the judicial role in enforcing
separation of powers in several other cases. His concurring opinion in Public
Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice, joined by Justices Rehnquist and
O’Connor, examines more deeply how using the Federal Advisory Committee
Act (FACA) to obtain records on presidential use of American Bar Association
ratings of potential judicial nominees constitutes an intrusion on the
Executive.136 Justice Kennedy writes allowing this request would allow
Congress to “interfere with the President’s constitutional prerogative to
nominate federal judges.”137
Justice Kennedy uses Public Citizen as a vehicle for justifying judicial
enforcement of separation of powers and judicial policing of Congress. To
Kennedy, “[i]t remains one of the most vital functions of this Court to police
with care the separation of the governing powers.”138 He admits, in this case,
“no immediate threat to liberty is apparent.” Nevertheless, he writes, “when
structure fails, liberty is always in peril.”139
While Justice Kennedy later states FACA, as applied in this case, “would
be a plain violation of the Appointments Clause of the Constitution,” his analysis
is not textual but primarily functional.140 Under Article II, he writes, “[n]o role
whatsoever is given either to the Senate or to Congress as a whole in the process
of choosing the person who will be nominated for appointment.”141 When the
power is exclusive to the President, “we have refused to tolerate any intrusion
by the Legislative Branch.”142 Among the cases cited is Chadha, but Justice
Kennedy’s focus here is more textual: he cites Justice Burger’s Supreme Court
opinion, which resting on the presentment clause, rather than his own Ninth
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Id.
Id. at 452–53.
Id. at 453.
491 U.S. 440, 467 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Circuit opinion.143 As Justice Kennedy writes, “[i]t is improper for this Court to
arrogate to itself the power to adjust a balance settled by the explicit terms of the
Constitution.”144 Instead, he states, “we are empowered to act in particular cases
to prevent any other Branch from undertaking to alter them.”145
While the bulk of the opinion relies on textualism, the final paragraph does
move more toward a functionalist approach: “It is also plain that the application
of FACA would constitute a direct and real interference with the President’s
exclusive responsibility to nominate federal judges.”146 As he concludes, “[t]he
mere fact that FACA would regulate so as to interfere with the manner in which
the President obtains information necessary to discharge his duty assigned under
the Constitution to nominate federal judges is enough to invalidate the Act.”147
In Cheney v. U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, another case
involving FACA, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion limited attempts by
Judicial Watch and Sierra Club to obtain discovery about the composition and
meetings of the National Energy Development Group created to advise the
president and vice president.148 The opinion allowed for limitations that “might
interfere with officials in the discharge of their duties and impinge on the
President’s constitutional prerogatives,” even when executive privilege is not
specifically invoked.149
Justice Kennedy’s opinion justifies limits on discovery by focusing on the
identity of the party. Limiting discovery acts to “give recognition to the
paramount necessity of protecting the Executive Branch from vexation litigation
that might distract it from the energetic performance of its constitutional
duties.”150 Interpreting Congress’s intent in FACA raises “separation-of-powers
considerations” and should “prevent a lower court from interfering with a
coequal branch’s ability to discharge its constitutional responsibilities.”151
Justice Kennedy notes that, unlike the litigation in United States v. Nixon,
this is a civil case.152 He focuses on the “burden imposed by discovery orders,”
the lack of checks on civil discovery, and that the requests in this case “ask for
everything under the sky,” are “similarly unbounded,” and “anything but
appropriate.”153 They would provide anything the party would want “and much
more besides.”154 He concludes, even “Nixon does not require the Executive

143.
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See id. at 486.
Id.
Id. at 487.
Id. at 488.
Id. at 488–89.
542 U.S. 367, 380–82 (2004).
Id. at 372–73.
Id. at 382.
Id.
Id. at 383–84 (citing 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974)).
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Id. at 388.
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Branch to bear the onus of critiquing the unacceptable discovery requests line
by line.”155
Justice Kennedy notes the “burden imposed by the discovery orders” and
the “overly broad discovery requests approved by the District Court in this
case.”156 As he notes, “special considerations control when the Executive
Branch’s interests in maintaining the autonomy of its office and safeguarding
the confidentiality of its communications are implicated.”157
Given these burdens, the Executive Branch should have other options
besides simply invoking executive privilege. That privilege “is an extraordinary
assertion of power” in which “coequal branches of the Government are set on a
collision course.”158 Such a claim requires courts to “balanc[e] the need for
information in a judicial proceeding and the Executive’s Article II
prerogatives.”159 This “places courts in [an] awkward position” and—as Nixon
stated—“should be avoided whenever possible.”160 Any belief that limitation
requires invocation of executive privilege and this inevitable conflict is a
“mistaken assumption” and a “mistaken reading” of Nixon “that the assertion of
executive privilege is a necessary precondition to the Government’s separationof-powers objections.”161 Rather, “all courts should be mindful of the burdens
imposed on the Executive Branch in any future proceedings.”162 Here, the
“[s]pecial considerations applicable to President and to the Vice President
suggest that courts should be sensitive to requests by the Government.”163
Justice Kennedy’s deference in Trump contrasts with his concurrence just
a month earlier in Pereira v. Sessions, which advocated considering a more
active role for courts in policing separation of powers.164 His short Pereira
concurrence addresses the questions he presented in his Ninth Circuit Chadha
opinion and makes explicit his support for reviewing the actions of agencies,
finally rejecting the “reflexive deference”165 he finds in decisions following
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.166
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Pereira presents a sharp contrast
with his final concurrence in Trump. Pereira, like Chadha, involved an
immigrant challenging his removal.167 Justice Kennedy joined Justice
Sotomayor’s majority opinion finding that the “stop time” rule—determined by
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id. at 385–86.
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Id. at 389–90.
Id. at 391.
Id.
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Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2109.
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the Attorney General under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act—is not triggered when a written notice to appear fails to
specify a time and date.168 “The plain text, the statutory context, and common
sense,” to Justice Sotomayor, “all lead inescapably and unambiguously to that
conclusion.”169 Dissenting, Justice Alito argues “a straightforward application
of Chevron requires us to accept the Government’s construction of the provision
at issue.”170
Justice Kennedy responds directly “to note [his] concern with the way in
which the Court’s opinion in Chevron has come to be understood and
applied.”171 To him such “cursory analysis” by courts “suggests an abdication
of the Judiciary’s proper role in interpreting federal statutes.”172 He finds “the
type of reflexive deference exhibited in some of these cases . . . troubling.”173
He continues: “[W]hen deference is applied to other questions of statutory
interpretation, such as an agency’s interpretation of the statutory provisions that
concern the scope of its own authority, it is more troubling still.”174 With this
statement, Justice Kennedy reiterated the concern he expressed in his 1984
public speech explaining Chadha that it remains “a problem of modern political
science to design the remedy for “a sprawling federal bureaucracy” that has
grown “uncontrolled.”175
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Pereira suggests part of a modern
remedy. Citing opinions from Justices Roberts, Thomas and Gorsuch, Justice
Kennedy writes that “[g]iven the concerns raised by some Members of this
Court, it seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in an appropriate case,
the premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have implemented that
decision.”176 He concludes that “[t]he proper rules for interpreting statutes and
determining agency jurisdiction and substantive agency powers should accord
with constitutional separation-of-powers principles and the function and
province of the Judiciary.”177 This final concurrence, where Justice Kennedy
rejects “reflexive deference” and advocates for an enhanced judicial role,
drastically contrasts with his Trump concurrence.
Justice Kennedy’s broader separation of powers approach on the Court
expands upon the framework he articulated on the Ninth Circuit in Chadha and
Beller. His opinions reject “reflexive deference,” and advocate for an assertive
judiciary to police the other branches in order to preserve individual liberty and
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Id. at 2121 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2120 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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Kennedy, Hoover Lecture, supra note 29, at 4.
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the regular exercise of power. His opinions also consider congressional
overreach and judicial intrusion to be greater threats than executive overreach.
III. BOUMEDIENE: RECONCILING LIBERTY AND SECURITY UNDER LAW
Justice Kennedy did join and write for majorities in several cases after 2001
and voted to strike government actions that violated the rights of enemy
combatants. These decisions culminated with his 2008 opinion for the Court in
Boumediene v. Bush.178 However, even when those decisions had the effect of
limiting executive power, his opinions expressed greater concern with the
inability of Congress to justify departures from existing law and policy. They
also presumed an essential role for courts as neutral or impartial factfinders in
balancing liberty and security within the framework of law.
In earlier cases involving those detained at Guantanamo after September
11, 2001, Justice Kennedy expressed willingness to use judicial power to limit
executive power and to protect habeas corpus as part of his ideal of separation
of powers to vindicate individual liberty. In Rasul v. Bush,179 he concurred that
federal courts have the jurisdiction to hear habeas challenges brought by
detainees.180 Against claims of military necessity, his opinion finds that under
the indefinite lease of the base, “Guantanamo Bay is in every practical respect a
United States territory, and it is one far removed from any hostilities.”181
Kennedy concludes that “courts maintain the power and the responsibility
to protect persons from unlawful detention even where military affairs are
implicated.”182 Detainees “are being held indefinitely, and without benefit of any
legal proceeding to determine their status.”183 The government claim of a power
to detain indefinitely “suggests a weaker case of military necessity and much
greater alignment with the traditional function of habeas corpus.”184 He
concedes that in transport “detention without proceedings or trial would be
justified by military necessity for a matter of weeks.”185 Yet for those held, “as
the period of detention stretches from months to years, the case for continued
detention to meet military exigencies becomes weaker.”186
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence finds Military
Commission Order No. 1 “exceeds limits that certain statutes, duly enacted by
Congress, have placed on the President’s authority to convene military
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courts.”187 He fears military tribunals “without independent review.”188 Echoing
his statements from earlier cases, he reiterates: “[c]oncentration of power puts
personal liberty in peril of arbitrary action by officials, an incursion the
Constitution’s three-part system is designed to avoid.”189
Justice Kennedy contrasts the newly created military commissions with
“regular military courts in our system,” established by Congress, finding
“several noteworthy departures.”190 He notes that, “[a]t a minimum a military
commission like the one at issue—a commission specially convened by the
President to try specific persons without express congressional authorization—
can be ‘regularly constituted’ by the standards of our military justice system only
if some practical need explains deviations.”191 He discusses rules from the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, including who can serve as a judge, the
powers that officials can exercise at trial, appointing commission members, and
routing of review and appeals.192 “[T]he greater powers of the Appointing
Authority . . . raise concerns that the commission’s decisionmaking may not be
neutral.”193 These differences “remove safeguards that are important to the
fairness of the proceedings and the independence of the court.”194 Thus the new
commissions “cannot be considered regularly constituted under United States
law and thus does not satisfy Congress’ requirement that military commissions
conform to the law of war.”195 Justice Kennedy concedes that, “[b]ecause
Congress has prescribed these limits, Congress can change them, requiring a
new analysis consistent with the Constitution and other governing laws.”196
In Boumediene v. Bush, Justice Kennedy wrote for a 5–4 majority
reaffirming that Guantanamo detainees “have the habeas corpus privilege,” for
which the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) and Military Commissions Act
(MCA) do not provide “an adequate and effective substitute.”197 Yet his primary
concern was whether the DTA passed by Congress was consistent with the role
for courts provided the Suspension Clause, which “protects the rights of the
detained by affirming the duty and authority of the Judiciary to call the jailer to
account.”198 After finding “doubt” in the record, he decides to “decline . . . to
infer too much, one way or the other, from the lack of historical evidence on
point.”199
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548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 638.
Id.
Id. at 644, 648.
Id. at 645.
Id. at 639–46.
Id. at 650.
Id. at 651.
Id.
Id. at 653.
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While it is the executive who detains prisoners, the constitutional criticisms
Justice Kennedy launches in Boumediene aim squarely at Congress. He states
that “here we confront statutes, the DTA and the MCA, that were intended to
circumscribe habeas review.”200 Unlike other laws “coextensive with traditional
habeas corpus,” Justice Kennedy finds, in limiting regulating jurisdiction and
grounds for appeal, Congress “intended the Court of Appeals to have a more
limited role in enemy combatant status determinations than a district court has
in habeas corpus proceedings.”201
For Justice Kennedy’s functional definition, “[w]hat matters is the sum
total of procedural protections afforded to the detainee at all stages, direct and
collateral.”202 Yet he process does not suffice: “Even when the procedures
authorizing detention are structurally sound, the Suspension Clause remains
applicable and the writ relevant.”203 As he concludes, “when the judicial power
to issue habeas corpus properly is invoked the judicial officer must have
adequate authority to make a determination in light of the relevant law and facts
and to formulate and issue appropriate orders for relief, including, if necessary,
an order directing the prisoner’s release.”204 Any re-examination of procedures
should “come close to reinstating the § 2241 habeas corpus process Congress
sought to deny them.”205 The MCA, supplemented by the DTA, “cannot bear
this interpretation.”206 Congress provided “an inadequate substitute for habeas
corpus” and “effects an unconstitutional suspension of the writ.”207
Justice Kennedy explicitly acknowledges “[t]he real risks, the real threats,
of terrorist attacks are constant and not soon likely to abate.”208 He admits, as in
Rasul, that “[p]ractical considerations and exigent circumstances inform the
definition and reach of the law’s writs.”209 These may require that habeas not
“be available at the moment the prisoner is taken into custody.”210 But, he writes,
“[t]he cases before us, however, do not involve detainees who have been held
for a short period of time.”211 Some have been held for six years or more.212
“[T]he costs of delay can no longer be borne by those who are held in
custody.”213
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Justice Kennedy’s Boumediene opinion concludes with a statement about
the “proper deference” that should be given to “political branches.”214 He
especially mentions the President’s “substantial authority to apprehend and
detain those who pose a real danger to our security.”215 Further, he states, “[o]ur
opinion does not undermine the Executive’s powers as Commander in Chief.”216
The final section, however, provides no similar respect to Congress as an
institution. It mentions “some designated Members of Congress” who “begin the
day with briefings that may describe new and serious threats to our Nation and
its people.”217 They are among “[t]he political branches” who, “consistent with
their independent obligations to interpret and uphold the Constitution, can
engage in a genuine debate about how best to preserve constitutional values
while protecting the Nation from terrorism.”218
In the end, Justice Kennedy sees both habeas—“a right of first
importance”—and the judiciary as central to “fidelity to freedom’s first
principles.”219 “Chief among these are freedom from arbitrary and unlawful
restraint and the personal liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation
of powers” which produce “the judicial authority to consider petitions for habeas
corpus relief.”220 He admits “[t]he laws and Constitution are designed to survive,
and remain in force, in extraordinary times”221 and concludes, “[l]iberty and
security can be reconciled; and in our system they are reconciled within the
framework of the law.”222
IV. JUSTICE KENNEDY AND PRESERVATION OF EXECUTIVE PRIMACY IN
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
While Justice Kennedy enforced limits on executive power in areas
involving enemy combatants after 2001, in other areas over the same timeframe
he consistently employed judicial power to preserve and protect the exercise of
executive power from interferences by Congress and the courts. In several cases,
he concedes that substantial claims to liberty are at stake, yet he supports judicial
deference to executive decisions in areas concerning national defense and
foreign affairs for fear of congressional or judicial intrusion on executive
policymaking.
In later cases, Justice Kennedy preserved executive power and presidential
primacy concerning foreign affairs. In Zadvydas v. Davis, he dissented from
Breyer’s majority opinion interpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act to
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prevent federal detention of removable aliens more than ninety days beyond the
completion of their removal period if considered by the Attorney General to be
a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with removal after the completion
of their sentence.223 Justice Kennedy admits “[t]he aliens’ claims are substantial;
their plight is real.”224 Yet, in the end, “a removable alien does not have the same
liberty interest as a citizen does.”225 More fundamentally, for Justice Kennedy,
the time limit imposed by the majority may infringe on the inherent authority of
the Executive Branch to conduct negotiations with other nations.226
Justice Kennedy emphasizes “the obvious necessity that the Nation speak
with one voice on immigration and foreign affairs matters.”227 With this limit,
he writes, “other countries can effect the release of these individuals back into
the American community” and “may ignore or disclaim responsibility to accept
their return.”228 He characterizes this effect as “interference with sensitive
foreign relations [and] becomes even more acute where hostility or tension
characterizes the relationship, for other countries can use the fact of judicially
mandated release to their strategic advantage, refusing the return of their
nationals to force dangerous aliens upon us.”229
Justice Kennedy fears that courts “can expand or contract the reasonable
period of detention based on [their] own assessment of the course of negotiations
with foreign powers.”230 This judicial power “goes far to undercut the position
of the Executive in repatriation negotiations” and has the effect of “weakening
the hand of our Government.”231 He concludes with concern that judicial
consideration of foreseeability of removal “would require the Executive Branch
to surrender its primacy in foreign affairs and submit reports to the courts
respecting its ongoing negotiations in the international sphere.”232
In Zivotofsky v. Kerry, Justice Kennedy reasserted his commitment to
protecting executive foreign policy prerogatives from congressional
interference.233 He joined liberal Justices in the Zivotofsky majority and wrote
an opinion to emphasize the need for the nation to speak with one voice in
foreign policy in terms of recognizing other nations.234 His opinion appeals to
the text of the Constitution, including the Reception Clause and treaty making

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

533 U.S. 678, 705 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 718.
Id. at 717.
Id. at 705.
Id. at 711.
Id.
Id. at 711–12.
Id. at 712.
Id. at 713.
Id. at 725.
135 S. Ct. 2076, 2081 (2015).
Id. at 2086.
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power of Article II, by using original intent and historical practice and
understanding .235
Ultimately, however, Kennedy relies on “functional considerations.”236
“Put simply the Nation must have a single policy regarding which governments
are legitimate in the eyes of the United States.”237 As he reiterates, “[t]hese
assurances cannot be equivocal,” and “[t]hat voice must be the President’s.”238
The presidency “has the characteristic of unity at all times.”239 “The President is
capable, in ways Congress is not, of engaging in the delicate and often secret
diplomatic contacts that may lead to a decision on recognition,” and “is also
better positioned to take the decisive, unequivocal action necessary to recognize
other states at international law.”240
Justice Kennedy admits recognition of other nations “is just one part of a
political process that may require Congress to make laws,” but finds that
functionally “the exclusive recognition power is essential to the conduct of
Presidential duties.”241 It is “an executive power that Congress may not
qualify.”242 Kennedy focuses on effects: “If the President is to be effective in
negotiations over a formal recognition determination, it must be evident to his
counterparts abroad that he speaks for the Nation on that precise question.”243
He concedes, “[i]t is not for the President alone to determine the whole
content of the Nation’s foreign policy” and that “it is essential the congressional
role in foreign affairs be understood and respected.”244 Nevertheless,
“[r]ecognition is an act with immediate and powerful significance for
international relations, so the President’s position must be clear.”245 Thus, in the
interest in speaking with one voice, “Congress cannot require him to contradict
his own statement regarding a determination of formal recognition.”246
Justice Kennedy reasons from this exclusive executive recognition power
that Congress’s act to require a specific nation to be noted on a passport to be an
unconstitutional intrusion. “That congressional command would not only
prevent the Nation from speaking with one voice but also prevent the Executive
itself from doing so in conducting foreign relations.”247 Place of birth is
considered “an official executive statement implicating recognition.”248 While
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. at 2085–86.
Id. at 2086.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2087.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2090.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2095.
Id.
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he admits “Congress has substantial authority over passports,” he concludes
“[t]o allow Congress to control the President’s communication in the context of
a formal recognition determination is to allow Congress to exercise that
exclusive power itself.”249 In the interest of speaking with one voice in foreign
policy, the Legislative Branch cannot “command the President to contradict an
earlier recognition determination in the issuance of passports.”250
In Ziglar v. Abbasi, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion held that those
detained after September 11 who may have suffered abuse, discrimination, and
violations of constitutional rights before removal could not sue the federal agents
and wardens responsible.251 While the opinion mentioned that the Plaintiff’s
theory of liability was based on Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics
Agents,252 he argued that the now-“disfavored” doctrine arose when “the Court
followed a different approach to recognizing implied causes of action than it
follows now,” one “far more cautious.”253 He specifically cites separation-ofpowers principles as a justification for refusing expansion.254
As in earlier opinions, Kennedy stresses how such litigation can influence
the exercise of executive power. “Claims against federal officials often create
substantial costs, in the form of defense and indemnification,” he writes.255 “In
addition, the time and administrative costs attendant upon intrusions resulting
from the discovery and trial process are significant factors to be considered.”256
Kennedy finds courts ill-suited to weigh “the projected costs and consequences
to the Government itself when the tort and monetary liability mechanisms of the
legal system are used to bring about the proper formulation and implementation
of public policies.”257
In Ziglar, arising after the September 11 terrorist attacks, Justice Kennedy
expressed concern about “special factors” that include the effect of discovery
and publicity about public policy choices made by the executive and by highranking officials.258 Even in suits brought against an individual official, he
writes, “these claims would call into question the formulation and
implementation of a general policy. This, in turn, would necessarily require
inquiry and discovery into the whole course of the discussions and deliberations
that led to the policies and governmental acts being challenged.”259 He fears “the
burden and demand of litigation might well prevent them—or, to be more

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id. at 2096.
Id.
137 S. Ct. 1843, 1896 (2017).
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1855, 1857.
Id. at 1861.
Id. at 1856.
Id.
Id. at 1858.
Id. at 1861.
Id. at 1860.
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precise, future officials like them—from devoting the time and effort required
for the proper discharge of their duties.”260 For this proposition he cites his own
opinion in Cheney.261
Justice Kennedy fears the implications of a “discovery and litigation
process would either border upon or directly implicate the discussion and
deliberations that led to the formation of the policy in question.”262 For Justice
Kennedy, “[a]llowing a damages suit in this context, or in a like context in other
circumstances, would require courts to interfere in an intrusive way with
sensitive functions of the Executive Branch.”263 Further, this litigation has the
potential to “challenge . . . major elements of the Government’s whole response
to the September 11 attacks, thus of necessity requiring an inquiry into sensitive
issues of national security.”264 But, “[n]ational-security policy is the prerogative
of the Congress and President.”265 Thus, “[t]he risk of personal damages liability
is more likely to cause an official to second-guess difficult but necessary
decisions concerning national-security policy.”266
This decision, Kennedy admits, may result in “insufficient deterrence to
prevent officers from violating the Constitution.”267 He concedes “some
executive actions have the sweeping potential to affect the liberty of so many is
a reason to consider proper means to impose restraint and to provide some
redress from injury.”268 Nonetheless, in this case his greater fear is that “high
officers who face personal liability for damages might refrain from taking urgent
and lawful action in a time of crisis. And, as already noted, the costs and
difficulties of later litigation might intrude upon and interfere with the proper
exercise of their office.”269 He recognizes the need for “balance to be struck, in
situations like this one, between deterring constitutional violations and freeing
high officials to make the lawful decisions necessary to protect the Nation in
times of great peril.”270 Yet he finds, “[t]he proper balance is one for the
Congress, not the Judiciary, to undertake.”271
In these opinions leading to Trump, Justice Kennedy expresses further
commitment to preserving executive power. He goes beyond form to assess the
practical effect congressional legislation and judicial proceedings will have on
the ability of the President and executive officials to design and implement
foreign policy and influence relations with other nations. He acknowledges the
260.
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264.
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Id. at 1860 (citing Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 382 (2004)).
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effect these decisions may have on individual liberty and the ability to hold
officials accountable for violations of the Constitution, but his commitment to
constitutional structure mandates judicial deference to the Executive to prevent
intrusion or interference with the primary role of the Executive in speaking for
the nation as well as making and implementing foreign policy.
V. TRUMP V. HAWAII: RECONCILING “SUBSTANTIAL DEFERENCE” AND
“FREEDOM THAT LASTS”
Justice Kennedy’s short concurrence in Trump is notable for four reasons:
what it says; what it does not say; the case it cites; and the cases it alludes to, but
does not explicitly cite. His final words as a Justice seek to reassure but instead
project concern.
If the constitutional issue is as straightforward as the majority and Justice
Kennedy suggest, the final two paragraphs of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
seem unnecessary. He joined “in full” Roberts’s majority opinion, which finds:
“Under these circumstances, the Government has set forth a sufficient national
security justification to survive rational basis review.”272 Justice Roberts further
asserted that “[w]e express no view on the soundness of the policy. We simply
hold today that plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the
merits of their constitutional claim.”273 In “further observation,” Justice
Kennedy finds “appropriate” to explicitly recognize the costs of executive
deference and a reconsideration of which branch is most likely to sacrifice
liberty the most.274
Rather than rejecting the “reflexive deference” he finds “troubling” in
Pereira,275 Kennedy’s Trump opinion relies on “the substantial deference that is
and must be accorded to the Executive in the conduct of foreign affairs”276
characteristic of his earlier opinions. His Trump concurrence is notable for what
it does not say—and the cases it does not cite—and for its target audience.
Justice Kennedy notes that “there may be some common ground” between
the majority and dissent.277 Both, in his view, suggest “governmental action may
be subject to judicial review to determine whether or not it is ‘inexplicable by
anything but animus,’ which in this case would be animosity to a religion.”278
His statement about the constitutional responsibility in this case is more striking
for what it omits than for what it says. To support this proposition of common
ground that courts “in some instances” have the power to review government
actions as “‘inexplicable by anything but animus,’” Kennedy quotes his own

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
Id.
Id. at 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2424.
Id. at 2423.
Id. at 2423–24 (citation omitted).
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majority opinion in Romer v. Evans,279 which struck a Colorado constitutional
Amendment because it “identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them
protection across the board.”280
Romer is the only case Justice Kennedy cites in his Trump concurrence.
But other relevant opinions are implicit in his argument. On the point of animus
based on religion, Justice Kennedy does not cite the opinion that most directly
addresses animosity to religion: Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah.281 There Justice Kennedy articulates a “fundamental nonpersecution
principle of the First Amendment,”282 finding government action “violated the
Nation’s essential commitment to religious freedom.”283
In finding impermissible animus against Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye
and the Santeria religion, Justice Kennedy’s opinion considered “both direct and
circumstantial evidence.”284 For him, “[r]elevant evidence includes, among
other things, the historical background of the decision under challenge, the
specific series of events leading to the enactment or official policy in question,
and the legislative or administrative history, including contemporaneous
statements made by members of the decisionmaking body.”285 Considering the
evidence in depth, he concludes “the neutrality inquiry leads to one conclusion:
The ordinances had as their object the suppression of religion.”286
The consideration of background context as well as “both direct and
circumstantial evidence” that was critical to Justice Kennedy’s rationale in
Church of the Lukumi and in Romer, however, conflicts with his commitment to
executive prerogative in the area of foreign affairs. Even some of the dissenters
in Trump express willingness to allow the government greater chance to make
the case for the constitutionality of the ban. Justice Breyer, for example,
concedes “[d]eclarations, anecdotal evidence, facts, and numbers taken
from amicus briefs are not judicial factfindings. The Government has not had an
opportunity to respond, and a court has not had an opportunity to decide.”287
This reality raises a dilemma for Justice Kennedy. Judicial examination of
such “direct and circumstantial evidence” raises concerns he mentioned in
previous cases. Alluding—though not referring—to the effects of discovery he
stated in Cheney and in Zivotofsky, Justice Kennedy then states “even if further
proceedings are permitted, it would be necessary to determine that any discovery

279. Id. at 2423 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996)).
280. 517 U.S. at 620.
281. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Church of the Lukumi is cited three times by the
Trump dissenters: by Justice Breyer after his second sentence and by Justice Sotomayor in text and in a footnote.
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2429, 2434, 2439, fn.3.
282. Church of the Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 523.
283. Id. at 523.
284. Id. at 540.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 542.
287. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2433 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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and other preliminary matters would not themselves intrude on the foreign
affairs power of the Executive.”288
Justice Kennedy attempts to balance his commitments to executive
deference and to an aggressive judicial power to define and enforce the full and
necessary meaning of liberty. Under the Constitution, he admits, “[t]here are
numerous instances in which the statements and actions of Government officials
are not subject to judicial scrutiny or intervention.”289 For Justice Kennedy,
however, “[t]hat does not mean those officials are free to disregard the
Constitution and the rights it proclaims and protects.”290 The obligation to
uphold their oath to the Constitution “is not confined to those spheres in which
the Judiciary can correct or even comment upon what those officials say or
do.”291
Kennedy’s statement in Trump echoes his 1980 Ninth Circuit writing in
Beller that courts cannot “give our opinion on the fairness of every application
of the military regulation.”292 Beller reiterated “[u]pholding the challenged
regulations as constitutional is distinct from a statement that they are wise,” as
“[t]he latter judgment is neither implicit in our decision nor within our province
to make.”293 In Trump, however, Justice Kennedy’ doubts expressed on behalf
of an “anxious world”294 itself serves as an implicit comment on the travel ban.
Justice Kennedy’s final two paragraphs in Trump echo faintly the final
words of his earlier, uncited opinion concerning unconstitutional official animus
against religion. In Church of the Lukumi, Kennedy concludes:
The Free Exercise Clause commits government itself to religious tolerance,
and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention stem from
animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all officials must pause to
remember their own high duty to the Constitution and to the rights it secures.
Those in office must be resolute in resisting importunate demands and must
ensure that the sole reasons for imposing the burdens of law and regulation are
secular. Legislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed to
persecute or oppress a religion or its practices. The laws here in question were
enacted contrary to these constitutional principles, and they are void.295

In Trump, Justice Kennedy sounds similar themes to seek to reassert this
constitutional meaning and promise. He concludes “the very fact that an official
may have broad discretion, discretion free from judicial scrutiny, makes it all the
more imperative for him or her to adhere to the Constitution and to its meaning

288. Id. at 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 812 (9th Cir. 1980), overruled by Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force,
527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008).
293. Id.
294. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
295. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993).
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and its promise.”296 He reiterates the importance of protections of “freedom of
belief and expression” and writes “[i]t is an urgent necessity that officials adhere
to these constitutional guarantees and mandates in all their actions, even in the
sphere of foreign affairs.”297 While his closing words about constitutional
commitments may have soothed in Church of the Lukumi, they ring hollow in
the context of the Trump decision.
Kennedy’s “further observation”298 in Trump attempts to reconcile his
reading of the Constitution with constitutional structure based on executive
deference. If some constitutional and executive behavior is beyond “those
spheres in which the Judiciary can correct or even comment upon what those
officials say or do,” then who is the audience?299 What need is there for a
disclaimer that even when “statements and actions of Government officials are
not subject to judicial scrutiny or intervention. That does not mean those officials
are free to disregard the Constitution and the rights it proclaims and protects”?300
Why emphasize that “[t]he oath that all officials take to adhere to the
Constitution is not confined to those [judicial] spheres”?301
The tension Kennedy identifies in Trump between executive discretion, the
Constitution, and the oath appears uncited, yet clear, references to Chief Justice
Marshall’s foundational opinion in Marbury v. Madison.302 Marshall states early
in Marbury that “[b]y the Constitution of the United States, the President is
invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is
to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political
character, and to his own conscience.”303 He continues, “whatever opinion may
be entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used, still
there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion. The subjects are
political. They respect the nation, not individual rights, and, being entrusted to
the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive.”304
Marshall in Marbury also invokes the constitutional oath as a limit on
unconstitutional action by the officials who take it.305 In discussing the duty of
judges to enforce a written constitution, he notes “the principle, supposed to be
essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is
void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that
instrument.”306 Marshall, too, appeals to the oath judges take:
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Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the constitution
of the United States, if that constitution forms no rule for his government? [I]f it
is closed upon him, and cannot be inspected by him?
If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn mockery. To
prescribe, or to take this oath, becomes equally a crime.307

In Trump, Justice Kennedy reinforces that “the very fact that an official
may have broad discretion, discretion free from judicial scrutiny, makes it all the
more imperative for him or her to adhere to the Constitution and to its meaning
and its promise.”308 This appears a concession that, perhaps, the Constitution is
not enough, and recognition that an oath to adhere to it cannot be enforced.
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Trump, ultimately, is best understood as
an appeal to conscience: to the conscience of executive officials, and to that of
the President himself. Only in this way does his lecture about the First
Amendment concerning establishment, free exercise of religion, and “freedom
of belief and expression” make sense.309 Justice Kennedy implies the current
Executive Branch either poses a threat to those values or can reasonably be
perceived as one. “It is an urgent necessity that officials adhere to these
constitutional guarantees and mandates in all their actions, even in the sphere of
foreign affairs.”310 He hopes that this adherence to constitutional guarantees will
occur, speaking for “an anxious world,” one that “must know that our
Government remains committed always to the liberties the Constitution seeks to
preserve and protect, so that freedom extends outward, and lasts.”311 Yet
Kennedy’s expression of hope implies fear, anxiety, and doubt—if not about
whether courts should defer to the executive, then about whether such deference
truly serves the values that the Constitution is designed to secure.
VI. FURTHER OBSERVATIONS: COULD CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE IMPERIL
LIBERTY?
Justice Kennedy’s final opinion in Trump both reflects the constitutional
commitments to executive power he has asserted throughout his career and casts
doubt upon the assumptions behind his larger separation of powers
jurisprudence. Dating from his Chadha opinion on the Ninth Circuit, he has
307. Id.
308. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
309. Id. By some measures, Kennedy has been the justice most committed to protecting free expression
across context and ideology. See COLUCCI, supra note 101, at 75–101. See generally Eugene Volokh, How the
Justices Voted in Free Speech Cases, 1994–2000, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1191 (2001),
http://www2.law.ucla.edu/volokh/howvoted.htm (updated through 2002). Kennedy reiterated these
commitments in two statements during his final Term: the majority opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo.
Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) and his concurring opinion in Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life
Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
For a recent reconsideration that ranks other justices ahead of Kennedy, see Lee Epstein et al., Do
Justices Defend the Speech They Hate?, 6 J.L. & COURTS 237, 237–62 (2018).
310. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2424.
311. Id.
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aggressively used judicial power to vindicate separation of powers. The opinion
and decision in Trump reflect his ideals—dating back to Beller—of deferring to
executive power, particularly in areas that implicate aspects of foreign affairs.
He has been especially attentive to both legislative and judicial actions that may
intrude on the core powers of the executive.
Justice Kennedy’s larger separation of powers jurisprudence initially
operated on two assumptions: that constitutional structure promotes liberty, and
that Congress is the branch most likely to threaten it. Justice Kennedy’s vote and
passionate words in Trump cast doubt on both of these premises. His earlier view
of the Constitution—as he stated in Boumediene presumes that liberty and
security can be reconciled within framework of law. Several of Justice
Kennedy’s opinions—from Beller to Zadvydas to Ziglar to Trump—suggest
structure itself may shield executive officials from accountability under the law
for violations of liberty.
His concurrence in Trump offers a final lesson about the nature of liberty,
the Constitution, and the essential limits of judicial power. Justice Kennedy was
the Justice most likely to strike laws for violating the Constitution,312 leading
one scholar to conclude he placed “no areas of law and policy off limits to
judicial action.”313 From his confirmation, Justice Kennedy has expressed liberty
as the highest constitutional value and advocated a judicial duty “to insure that
the word ‘liberty’ in the Constitution is given its full and necessary meaning,
consistent with the purposes of the document as we understand it.”314
Throughout his career, Justice Kennedy emphasized liberty as the first and
last words of significant opinions protecting individual rights.315 He has joined
opinions stating “[l]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt,”316 and
that, “[w]hen contending parties invoke the process of the courts, however, it
becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional
issues the judicial system has been forced to confront.”317
Yet Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Trump introduces doubt about the
extent of that judicial responsibility and about whether constitutional structure
and deference to the executive in the area of foreign policy really do promote
liberty. He questions “[w]hether judicial proceedings may properly continue in
this case” and whether “it would be necessary to determine that any discovery

312. Frank J. Colucci, Sherry’s Model Justice: Anthony Kennedy, 16 GREEN BAG 2D. 455, 455–56 (2013).
313. THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN
JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 253 (2004).
314. Hearings, supra note 101, at 122.
315. Three examples: (1) The joint opinion in Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey begins and ends
with “liberty,” 505 U.S. 833, 844, 901 (1992); (2) Lawrence v. Texas begins with “liberty” and ends with
“freedom,” 539 U.S. 558, 562, 579 (2003); (3) Obergefell v. Hodges uses “liberty” three times in the first
paragraph, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
316. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
317. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000).
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and other preliminary matters would not themselves intrude on the foreign
affairs power of the Executive.”318
Justice Kennedy’s earlier opinions expressed an essential connection
between constitutional structure and liberty. Boumediene, for example, stands
on the ideal “[t]he laws and Constitution are designed to survive, and remain in
force, in extraordinary times. Liberty and security can be reconciled; and in our
system they are reconciled within the framework of the law.”319 His opinion in
Trump—reflecting themes from his Beller opinion through more recent cases
involving deference to the executive in foreign affairs—raises doubts about
whether law alone is truly capable of reconciling liberty and security.320
Kennedy’s last opinion on the Court reaffirmed his broader commitment to
“substantial deference” to the executive in foreign affairs.321 But Trump went
further, rejecting the ideal of judicial power to define and enforce liberty that
had stood at the center of his jurisprudence. His opinion concedes that some
executive decisions involving foreign policy are beyond the scope of courts and
law, even when they implicate core claims of individual liberty.
Kennedy’s “further observations” in Trump, expressing “urgent necessity”
on behalf of “[a]n anxious world,” signal a final reckoning about the connection
between constitutional structure and liberty.322 His closing appeal to executive
conscience recalls his earlier statement that “the Framers of the Constitution
could not command statesmanship. They could simply provide structures from
which it might emerge.”323 In Clinton, failure of statesmanship did not justify an
unconstitutional law; in Trump, anxiety about the true motives cannot invalidate
a power over foreign policy granted by the Constitution to the Executive.
“When structure fails,” Kennedy wrote as a younger Justice, “liberty is
always in peril.”324 Yet constitutional structure cannot guarantee that those
exercising powers do so wisely, or that the people it serves retain confidence in
their commitment to the broader purposes constitutions are established to
secure.325 As then-Judge Kennedy stated in 1982 before coming to the Court,
318. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
319. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008).
320. For criticism of the connection Kennedy expressed in Bond and Boumediene between separation of
powers and liberty, see Aziz Z. Huq, Libertarian Separation of Powers, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1006, 1007,
1039 (2014).
321. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
322. Id.
323. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 452–53 (1998).
324. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 468 (1989).
325. For extended discussion of the distinction between maintaining a constitution and commitment to
constitutionalism, see Walter F. Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 3, 3–25 (Douglas
Greenburg et al. eds., 1993).
As Donald P. Kommers once put the difference: “A constitution is a written document.
Constitutionalism is a state of mind. Thus one can have a constitution without constitutionalism.” Donald P.
Kommers, Negative Lessons from the American Experience: A Response to Professor Katz, in STANLEY M.
KATZ, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE: SOME NEGATIVE LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN
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“the Constitution, in some of its most critical aspects, is what the political
branches of government have made it, whether the judiciary approves or not.”326
When officials empowered under the Constitution act in ways that depart from
its meaning and promise, structure itself imperils any confidence “that freedom
extends outward, and lasts.”327 Kennedy’s final opinion in Trump sounds a
warning that extends beyond the instant case: The framework of law, enforced
by courts, cannot suffice to reconcile liberty and security.

EXPERIENCE 20, 20 (1994), https://www.ghi-dc.org/fileadmin/user_upload/GHI_Washington/PDFs/
Constitutionalism_in_East_Central_Europe.pdf. Kommers explicitly identified “the exponential growth of
presidential power in our time, particularly in the fields of foreign and military affairs” as one of the
“breakdowns” in American constitutionalism. Id. at 25.
326. Hearings, supra note 101, at 221 (quoting Kennedy, L.A. Patent Lawyer’s Assoc., supra note 75, at
9).
327. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2424 (Kennedy, J. concurring).

